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Abstract 
 
Network form of economic organization is subtle compared to markets and 
hierarchies, due to the importance or social interactions. Based on a literature 
review we establish complex exchange ties; a set of behavioral patterns decisive 
in network form of economic organization. Further, an agency problem where 
complex exchange ties are implemented is analyzed. We discuss the effects of 
complex exchange ties as both preferences and external motivations. We find 
that under some circumstances one can reach improved second best outcomes. 
It becomes harder to improve outcomes as the social structure become more 
complex, however.  
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1. Introduction 
Numerous economic models assume that economic actors solely pursue their 
own material wealth, with no concern for the social implications of their actions. 
This can in many cases be correct, but model predictions with this assumption 
can also be refuted due to the fact that human behavior tend to be more 
complex. The “ultimatum game”, an experimental game first studied by Güth, 
Schmittberger et al. (1982), has proven useful to study deviations from the 
assumption that economic actors are purely self-interested. Ultimatum game 
studies show that people tend to distribute their wealth differently, and make 
other choices than predicted by the neoclassical approach (Camerer, 
Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004). One can argue that neoclassical theory can be 
scant in the agent behavioral scope; it does not specify whether economic agents 
care about other things than what is included in the model. It does not rule out 
the possibility that this can in fact be the case; the possibility is simply left out of 
the analysis. Fairness and social preferences are two characteristics of human 
behavior which behavioral economists believe can improve the realism of 
economic models, and make them more reflective of psychological mechanisms 
in economic agents’ behavior. By adding such considerations to economic 
thinking, a possible result is to supplement existing results with more efficient 
outcomes.  
 
Agency theory is one of the large literatures where the analytical framework is, 
in many cases, founded on the neoclassical approach and its assumptions. 
Principal-agent models can be very simple, addressing complex coordination 
problems with only a few variables, still with an analysis complex enough. 
Agency-problems are important to economic life, and they reflect coordination 
problems observable in various situations in everyday life. Examples might be 
interaction between a firm and its workers; team work at the university; and an 
elementary school teacher and a pupil. Accordingly, it seems pertinent to discuss 
additional behavioral patterns when the social interaction per se is an important 
part of the economic problem, like in agency theory. 
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Research indicate that behavioral norms and decisions can rely on the context 
and culture they materialize in (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004). 
Network form of economic organization is an economic environment that seems 
to facilitate more complex behavioral patterns. Thus, when economic activity is 
organized in network form, many of the behavioral assumptions in neoclassical 
frameworks might not fit.   
 
Accordingly, the intention with this thesis is to address the behavioral patterns 
identified in network form of economic organization, and discuss them in the 
light of a simple neoclassical principal-agent model. The analysis will depend on 
recent advances in behavioral economics, together with research on network 
form of economic organization. First of all, a literature review of relevant 
theories and reasoning is presented. Based on this, some core behavioral 
mechanisms prevalent in network form of economic organization is identified 
and defined as complex exchange ties. Further, three theoretical approaches is 
identified before we present our research question.  
 
In the second part of the thesis, complex exchange ties are included in the 
analysis of a simple principal-agent model. A common approach from behavioral 
economics is used; the model is extended with some additional variables which 
allow the model to capture behavioral mechanisms that previously was ignored. 
The model is analyzed in three stages: To begin with only the agent is assigned 
with complex exchange ties. In this section we find that, if the agent has some 
utility from complex exchange ties, it improves the second best outcome to the 
contract problem. As we discuss in the literature review, complex exchange ties 
rest on interdependence between actors. Hence, modeling complex exchange 
ties as a preference only to the agent is not sufficient. Therefore, bilateral 
complex exchange ties are considered in the following section.    
 
This section consist of two complementary discussions: First, we assign the 
principal with complex exchange ties. In this part we find that, if the principal has 
preferences to complex exchange ties there will, under some specifications of 
the principal’s preferences, be an improved second best outcome. Second, we 
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inquire to what extent the strategic economic environment in fact can alter the 
agent’s behavioral judgments. Now we allow the agent’s utility from complex 
exchange ties to be dependent on the actions chosen by the principal. In this 
case it becomes harder to achieve a better second best outcome from complex 
exchange ties. Two reasons can explain this: The fact that the economic 
environment need to alter the agent’s behavioral judgments, which depends on 
the distribution of actor preferences and eventually the social norms; preference 
dependency reduce possible outcomes, which improve the second best outcome 
when the principal and the agent differ in their complex exchange ties 
preferences. 
 
In the last part we consider the agent’s ability to deter the principal’s decision of 
not acting according to the social norm, in a two period game. From the analysis 
it is clear that the agent have a limited ability to deter the principal’s deviation 
from the social norm. The principal is however under some conditions better off 
behaving according to the agent’s preferences.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Principal-agent theory 
Incentives are at the core of economic thinking. Using incentives, economists 
describe actors anticipated behavior and solve coordination problems. Ross 
(1973), among others, aligned incentives and economic coordination. He 
analyzed what he considered as “the principal’s problem”; a universal problem 
where different objectives and asymmetric information, between the principal 
and the agent, give rise to a coordination problem when the principal delegate 
some task to the agent. This contributed to the principal-agent model, a broad 
framework where the principal’s use of some payoff structures helps to motivate 
the agent, such that the coordination problem is solved.  
 
A major part of the principal-agent and contract theory literature is focused on 
the moral hazard issue, the nature of the problem is stated by Mas-Colell, Green, 
and Whinston (1995, 477): 
  
The hidden action case, also known as moral hazard, is illustrated by the 
owner’s inability to observe how hard his manager is working… 
 
Due to the very nature of task delegation, the principal is no longer able to 
observe the actions chosen by the agent. Since actions are not observable, nor 
verifiable, they cannot be contracted upon; the principal is now faced with moral 
hazard (Laffont and Martimort 2002). Mirrlees (1999) shows that self-interest 
and unobservable behavior can restrain Pareto-optimality in agency 
relationships. This implies costs higher than in first-best implementation of the 
agent’s actions. Consequently, as proposed by Grossman and Hart (1983, 14): 
“there exists a second best optimal action … and a second-best optimal incentive 
scheme …”. In general, second-best best implementation is less desirable than 
first-best; there is a variety of different model classes of agency problems which 
make the various second-best implementations differ, however. In any way, one 
can define agency cost as:  
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The agency cost is the expected net payoff for the Principal under full 
information [first best] less what it is in the second-best situation (Cowell 
2006, 364). 
 
Several principal-agent models share the same set of assumptions. The intention 
is to simplify the models, so it becomes possible to predict outcomes in a specific 
economic environment. To succeed with this it is necessary to place restrictions 
on economic actors and how they will behave. A fundamental model assumption 
is economic utilitarianism, that all principals and agents are concerned with 
utility maximization (Wright, Mukherji, and Kroll 2001). Noreen (1988, 360) 
draws the link between utilitarianism and self-interest, which he argue leads to 
opportunistic behavior: “Utilitarian ethical behavior, *…+, has to do with 
voluntary compliance with rules that are, in some sense, in the individual's own 
self-interest”. Summarized, economic agents are assumed to be fully-law 
abiding, opportunistic, and self-interested. In order for the model to say anything 
at all, agent behavior also needs to be rationale, i.e. predictable.  
  
From assumptions, one is allowed to discover important mechanisms in the 
agency relationship. It can be argued that assumptions need to be present due to 
the complexity of contractual problems. Williamson (1981, 553) implies that: 
 
There is a tendency, however, to accept this fact [complexity] as given 
rather than inquire into the reason for it. [-And that-] What is needed, I 
submit, is more self-conscious attention to “human nature as we know it”.  
 
Accordingly, Wright, Mukherji, and Kroll (2001) argue that agency theory has its 
limitation of being narrow due to its assumptions, which the authors claim, 
makes it less reflective of realities in economic relationships. More precise 
(Wright, Mukherji, and Kroll 2001, 414):  
 
…the restrictive assumptions of agency theory discount the possibility 
that diverse individuals in various situations may behave differently. 
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2.1.1. Agency theory and transaction cost economics 
Agency theory, as stated above, is a universal framework applicable to various 
types of transactions.  Classical contract law is the governing mean in a market 
transaction; mainstream economic theory is to a large extent founded on this. 
Here one finds “thick” markets in which: “…individual buyers and sellers bear no 
dependency relation to each other. Instead, each party can go its own way at 
negligible cost to another” (Williamson 1991, 271). Transactions in “thick” 
markets will in an ideal world be: “sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by 
clear performance” (Macneil 1974, 738). This reflects the character of the 
contract; very legalistic, hard bargaining, strict enforcement with autonomous 
agents. 
 
A firm can be thought of as a continuation of the market relation; however the 
mean to govern the contractual relations is that of forbearance (Williamson 
1991). An illustration can be the comparison of a seller and a buyer with an 
employer and employee. The former transaction will take place in a market and 
the latter in a hierarchy. The point being that the properties in the contractual 
respect is comparable; however, the contractual law differs. Ultimately, the firm 
can be described as a “nexus of contracts” where the hierarchy is its own court 
of law (Williamson 1991). Transaction cost economizing is not subject to 
discussion in this thesis report. The underlying principles in how agents relate to 
the transaction and the contracting situation are important, however. 
 
In both markets and hierarchies many of the underlying assumptions in the 
transaction, and especially the contracting difficulties, are the same. In this sense  
agency theory has applicability to individuals, group and firm contexts, and 
accordingly to both forms of economic organization described above (Wright, 
Mukherji, and Kroll 2001). 
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2.2. Network form of economic organization 
Williamson (1985, 1975) distributes economic transactions in what can be 
interpreted as a continuum, where he identifies markets and hierarchies as two 
“poles” in how economic transactions are organized. He later complements his 
theory with a hybrid mode, something in-between markets and hierarchies 
(Williamson 1991). From his theories, several aspects can be inferred: First, 
Williamson implies that markets are the point of departure for economic 
transactions. From this, one can raise the question if transactions always emerge 
from the attributes and mechanisms decisive in markets. Second, distributing 
transactions along this continuum might place restrictions on possible extensions 
to relevant assumptions. Such a mechanical interpretation of economic exchange 
can limit the understanding of complex realities in transactions. Querying the 
critique above, Powell (1990) introduced networks as a distinct way of organizing 
economic activity.  
 
Powell (1990) discuss in his seminal paper how networks function as a distinctive 
way of coordinating economic activity. That is, a form of economic organization 
different from both markets and hierarchies. The argument proposed by Powell 
(1990, 303) is:  
 
In network models of resource allocation, transactions occur neither 
through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through 
networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually 
supportive action.  
 
Podolny and Page (1998, 59) characterizes network form of organization 
accordingly: 
  
We define a network form of organization as any collection of actors (N≥ 
2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another 
and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to 
arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange. 
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Based on Podolny and Page (1998)’s definition, it is evident that network form of 
economic organization can include various agreements: Everything from joint 
ventures and strategic alliances on one hand, and relational contracts on the 
other.   
 
Continuation of the discussion above, Powell (1990) presents in his paper a 
stylized comparison of the different forms of economic organization. The key 
takeaways is listed in the table below, and summarized in the text. 
 
Table 1: Stylized Comparison of Forms of Economic Organization 
 Forms 
Key features Market Hierarchy Network 
Normative Basis Contract – 
Property rights 
Employment 
relationship  
Complementary 
strengths 
Means of 
communication 
Prices Routines Relational 
Methods of conflict 
resolution 
Haggling – resort 
to courts for 
enforcement 
Administrative 
fiat – supervision 
Norm of reciprocity – 
reputational concerns 
Amount of 
commitment among 
the parties 
Low Medium to high Medium to high 
Actor preferences or 
choices 
Independent Dependent Interdependent 
Source: Powell (1990, 300) 
 
Contrasting networks with markets and hierarchies, Powell (1990) argues that 
transactions in the first rely on complementary strengths and interdependence 
between the agents. In addition, they have relational means of communication, 
together with reputational concerns. Aligning the stylized comparison with the 
stated definition proposed by Powell (1990), it is obvious that social ties between 
agents involved in the exchange is important. The key differences which is 
important to our discussion is what shape opportunities and expectations; 
namely the structure and quality of exchange ties. Economic relations are no 
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longer cool and atomistic as in market transactions, but embedded in a more 
complex set of variables. According to Uzzi (1996, 674) embeddedness refers to:  
 
...the process by which social relations shape economic action in ways 
that some mainstream economic schemes overlook or misspecify when 
they assume that social ties affect economic behavior only minimally or, 
reduce the efficiency of the price system.     
 
Uzzi (1996) makes several empirically supported inferences about embedded 
networks. Network structures can be something between loose and close-knit 
inter-firm connections. Hence, the level of embeddedness is not constant, but 
can vary from weak to strong. Further, this imply that the social structure enable 
or constrain the actions available to agents, something which is particular to 
network form of economic organization (referred to as embedded networks from 
now on). Consequently, it should no longer be peripheral that social relations 
affect economic performance, opposed to the predictions of neo-classical 
economic models. Indeed, Uzzi (1996) shows that research participants differ in 
their perceptions about arms-length transactions and transactions within 
networks. Their behavior is closely linked to the functions and features of 
embedded ties. In particular embedded networks facilitate reciprocity, inter-firm 
coordination and joint problem-solving. This is coherent with Powell (1990)’s 
observations of reciprocity, interdependence and mutual interests when 
exchange is organized in networks. 
 
Noticeably, the underlying principles in how agents now relate to the transaction 
differ compared to standard economic models. In neoclassical theory, regardless 
of how transactions are organized, many of the above discussed behavioral 
assumptions seem to be prevailing. Presumably, as exchange ties move from 
absent or weak towards a stronger and more complex set of social variables, 
these assumptions need to be relaxed. To what extent the agent plays the 
cooperative game, acts selfish, is pure or bounded in rationality, can depend on 
the social structure of the network (Uzzi 1997). Uzzi (1997, 57) suggests the 
following proposition:  
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The greater the level of embeddedness in an organization’s network, the 
more likely are Pareto-improved solutions to coordination problems.  
 
A natural question is whether this adds complexity to economic models of 
exchange, such as agency theory. 
 
2.3. Social preferences and incentives 
To what extent social and relational considerations add complexity to economic 
models, and in particular agency theory, is a question of understanding how such 
mechanisms work as incentives. We know that the understanding of explicit 
material incentives, and how they guide economic actors’ actions and choices, is 
important in economics. A consequence of the neo-classical assumptions is that 
economic law-abiding actors care less, or not at all, about social consequences 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986b). This is not necessarily a realistic 
assumption. 
 
Behavioral experiments show that our behavior is more complex than the 
canonical model described in section 2.1. Rabin (1993) discuss how social and 
relational considerations have economic implications in altruistic behavior, 
however that altruism is more complex than uniformly kindness, as  explained by 
Fehr and Gachter (2000, 160) : ”Altruism is a form of unconditional kindness; that 
is, altruism given does not emerge as a response to altruism received”. The form 
can change, i.e. if it applies in general or is more targeted. In any case, it is 
founded on the simple hypothesis that economic actors care about the wellbeing 
of others (Rabin 2002). 
 
Departures from self-interest is to a large extent confirmed by Henrich et al. 
(2001). Henrich et al. (2001, 73-74) found in cross-social and cross-cultural 
ultimatum game experiments that: “the canonical model is not supported in any 
society”; “group level differences in economic organization … explain a 
substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies”; “behavior in the 
Thesis Report GRA 19002  01.09.2011 
Page 11 
experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life”. In 
other words, to use stringent assumptions and ignore social and relational 
considerations need not be the only right. The important point is not to reject 
the parsimony of standard economic models, but to highlight that those 
additional considerations might have implications on fundamentals of economic 
actions. 
 
A common approach in the literature is to incorporate social and relational 
consideration as social preferences.  As stated by Fehr and Fischbacher (2002, 2): 
 
A person exhibits social preferences if the person not only cares about the 
material resources allocated to her but also cares about the material 
resources allocated to relevant referent agents. 
 
Experimental studies show that a fraction between 44 and 60 percent of subjects 
exhibit such social preferences and, contrary to what stated above, 20 to 30 
percent behave completely selfish (Fehr and Gachter 2000). Fehr and Gachter 
(2000) conclude that there seems to be conformity among experimental 
researchers on the concept of social preferences as a behavioral response, the 
sources of its occurrence diverges, however. Charness and Rabin (2002) find that 
social-welfare preferences outperform some other possible sources. Sources of 
social preferences is not subject to this thesis, but the following analysis is based 
on two possible results of social preference: As suggested by Rabin (1993), (i)  
that individuals act in response to kind or hostile intensions, in the literature 
known as reciprocal behavior; (ii) That individuals respond to what type they are 
faced with (not behavior or intentions) (Levine 1998).  
 
Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger (1997)’s experimental results show that social 
preferences can have a significant effect as a contract enforcement device. They 
find a strong impact on both demanded and enforced effort, resulting in higher 
rents to both parties. What is not that obvious is how to contract such intrinsic 
incentives, and the interaction with explicit incentives. In fact, Fehr and Gachter 
(2000) show that explicit incentive contracts yield lower average effort levels. 
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This is supported by the findings of Fehr and Schmidt  (2000, 1061): “(i) The 
average effort under the implicit contract is much higher than under the explicit 
contract. (ii) The average bonus payment is always positive”. From this, one can 
understand that implicit contracts are not only successful in eliciting effort from 
the agent, but also that the principal do in fact fulfill the implicit contract. Other 
papers also conclude that social preferences and reciprocal behavior can be a 
source to efficiency gains. One instance is under the provision of incomplete 
labor contracts – when both workers and firms can be better off when they 
entrust stable bilateral reciprocity considerations (Fehr et al. 1998).   
 
2.4. Embeddedness and agency theory     
Agency costs will arise in any cooperative effort, even if the principal-agent 
relationship seems concurrent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In other words, it is 
unrealistic to imagine a transaction without any information asymmetries or 
conflicts in terms of what action to be carried out by the agent. Regardless if 
transactions take place in embedded networks, the variables which influence 
positively the agent’s level of production can also generate a disutility for the 
agent; in that way, most likely, result in a conflict between the agent and the 
principal despite their mutual interests. This is stressed to demonstrate that 
problems of moral hazard should not be extraneous in embedded networks. 
Considering that firms become less autonomous when transactions are 
organized in such way, agency theory should be highly relevant. Most of all due 
to the delegation of activities; the principal loses the ability to control actions 
when they are no longer observable. 
 
Presumably, the contracting situation might be different under embeddedness 
compared to that of arms-length, and intuitively one can expect the analysis to 
grow more complex as social structures in the transaction changes. 
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3. Thesis objective 
Following the previous discussion, the goal with the rest of the thesis report is to 
apply a simple principal-agent framework on embedded networks.  
 
Due to the very differences in the basic model assumptions and the features of 
embedded networks, some adjustments to the model are necessary. In order to 
extend a standard principal-agent model, a sensible approach proposed by 
Diamond and Vartiainen (2007), is to query when its basic assumptions are 
violated. This will enable us to establish useful facts and intuition on how to 
extend the chosen model. The following subsections will for that reason define 
complex exchange ties; a set of behavioral assumptions which capture the 
essence in embedded networks. At a later stage, the consequences of complex 
exchange ties will be analyzed in the modeling-framework. This can be 
summarized in our thesis objective: 
 
Thesis objective: To analyse the implications of complex exchange ties on the 
coordination problem between the principal and the agent. 
 
Three possible approaches seem plausible to why economic actors might behave 
differently compared to what mainstream economics usually would predict: 
 
I. Individuals gain some utility from altruism, reciprocity and other 
social preferences. However, economic actors are still behaving utility 
maximizing, and simply optimize their behaviour with respect to such 
considerations. 
  
II. Behavioural judgements are influenced by some external motivations. 
Agents no longer behave solely based on their utility maximization, 
but are assigned additional behavioural patterns, i.e. change their 
behaviour, due to some social norms or other forms of environmental 
policies. 
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III. Individuals behave according to some external motivations as in (II), 
not because these motivations alter the actor’s behavioural 
judgments; but for the reason that deviating from them imposes 
some costly consequences on the actor which makes him worse off, 
compared to not deviating. 
 
Research question: Using (I), (II) and (III) as fundamentals in complex exchange 
ties; are the different approaches likely to change the outcome compared to the 
initial model? 
 
3.1. Defining complex exchange ties (CET) 
As discussed in section 2.2, assumptions in simple principal-agent models can be 
in conflict with the fundamentals of embedded networks. In defining CET, 
inspiration is found in behavioral economics and social preferences, i.e. agents 
are no longer necessarily exclusively pursuing their self-interest.  
 
It is necessary to align social preferences with interdependence and cooperation, 
as a key feature of embedded networks, in order to fully explain CET. What is 
distinctive with cooperative problems and social preferences is how the 
economic environment shapes the relationship between the actors and their 
preferences. This is transferable to embedded networks, where the institutional 
properties cause behavioral effects (Larson 1992). Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) 
states that:  
 
…reciprocal subjects are willing to cooperate if they are sure that the 
other people who are involved in the cooperation problem will also 
cooperate. 
 
Such conditional cooperation is depending on several ideas. First, beliefs about 
the social norm and social interaction seem to be important (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2002). If you believe that other members in your network put forth 
cooperative behavior, you are more likely to do the same. Second, when 
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selecting network members in order to induce cooperation, the “right” people 
are chosen – and shirking actors will be fired. According to Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2002), this is efficient in establishing internal equality so that cooperation will 
not unravel. Accordingly, we get definition one – which is coherent with (II) 
above:  
 
Definition one: Complex exchange ties emerge from the peculiar interaction 
between social preferences, cooperative effort and the economic environment. 
 
In section 2.2 we learned from Uzzi (1997), that behavior of economic actors in 
embedded networks is affected by the social structure in the network. Further, 
that this has implications on what kind of game the agent plays. More precise:  
 
…the level of embeddedness in a network increase with the density of 
embedded ties. Conversely, networks with a high density of arm’s-length 
ties have low embeddedness and resemble an atomistic market (Uzzi 
1997, 48). 
 
Accordingly, CET is allowed to vary from weak to strong as the social structures 
changes, i.e. as the embeddedness changes. Hence, we get definition two which 
can apply to all three (I), (II), and (III): 
 
Definition two: Complex exchange ties get stronger as the network becomes 
more embedded. 
 
An important feature for embedded networks, thus also an important ingredient 
in CET, is reciprocal behavior. Reciprocity can simply be described as fair actions. 
If someone acts in a good manner, you act in a reciprocal good manner back; if 
someone treats you bad, you treat that person bad in return. Rabin (1993, 1282) 
establishes some stylized facts on reciprocity, or fairness: 
 
(A) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help 
those who are being kind. 
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(B) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to punish 
those who are being unkind. 
 
Definition three follows, and is coherent with (I): 
 
Definition three:  When economic actors are concerned with complex exchange 
ties, they are willing to sacrifice some material well-being in order to reciprocate 
the behavior of network members. 
 
From table 1, we know agents in embedded networks have reputational and 
relational concerns. Accordingly we assume that agents with CET will have some 
intrinsic values in contributing in the network; from building relations to other 
agents and improving the network reputation. At the same time agents will gain 
from the complementary strengths in other network members. Consequently, 
this result in definition four which is also related to (I): 
 
Definition four: Complex exchange ties include intrinsic value considerations on 
network reputation and complementary strengths. 
 
4. A principal-agent model with complex exchange ties 
In this part of the thesis, CET will be implemented into a simple moral hazard 
model. 
 
To reduce the complexity of the analysis, the mechanisms emerging from the 
network are generalized in to a simple principal-agent relationship; even though, 
the network contains more than one principal and one agent. Accordingly, the 
network considerations will be captured in actors’ values and preferences, i.e. 
CET will be adopted into the analysis. The intention with the analysis is to 
capture the effect of CET related to the task delegation. Further, it is assumed 
that the design of the contract between the principal and the agent is 
independent of all other network members. 
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According to the definitions in chapter three, it will be assumed that an agent 
can obtain utility from some intrinsic values related to social ties in the 
embedded network he belongs to. Fehr (1997) observes that intrinsic values, 
especially reciprocity, have an effect on firm behaviour. In harmony with the 
stylized facts on reciprocity, and definition three, firms reward agents when they 
fulfil the contract in the case of strong reciprocity considerations. Based on 
definition three and four, economic actors with CET have additional concerns 
other than the material transfers they receive. Initially we will consider the case 
when only the agent cares about CET, before in 4.3 allowing the principal such 
preferences. Finally, in 4.4, we will consider a two period situation where an 
agent with CET is faced with a self-interested principal. 
 
4.1. Theoretical framework 
Our analysis will be founded on a moral hazard model with effort and 
production, in which the agent’s action is not directly observable to the principal. 
The basics of the model are described below. The initial model and notations in 
the following subsection will be similar to what is used by Laffont and Martimort 
(2002, 150-163). 
 
Consider an agent with an effort, denoted  . The agent has either none or 
positive effort, normalized to zero or one:   in      . Effort is costly and 
generates a disutility for the agent equal to    , where           
and         .  
 
The agent will receive a transfer   from the principal for exerting effort. This 
implies the following separable utility function:             with         
and         . The stochastic production level   can either take a low or high 
value      , and production increases in effort level. The stochastic influence of 
effort on production is given by probability    and   , with       . Where, 
(         .   
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Further, the principal has a utility function which is increasing in performance, 
thus he prefers production with a positive effort level (   ). The agent’s effort 
is not observable to the principal, thus he offer the agent a contract contingent 
the random output  . Reward to the agent is linked to output with the 
function       . Thus, the realized production level   or   yields accordingly 
  or   . 
 
A risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent are considered.   
 
4.2. Extensions to the basic model: An agent with complex exchange ties 
In addition to transfer   or    from the principal, as stated in definition four, the 
agent receives some intrinsic value from CET; in contributing to a good network 
reputation, the constant     and gaining from complementary strengths of others 
in the network, the constant   . To what extent the agent is concerned with CET, 
is captured in the strength parameter   which is   0. The agent’s utility is 
increasing in   if he has a preference for CET. For an agent with no preference 
for CET     and this brings us back to the initial model. The total utility gain 
from being a part of the embedded network, and having CET is          . It is 
assumed that CET only applies if a positive effort level is exerted by the agent. 
This is due to the nature of CET; if the agent exerts zero effort he will not have an 
utility increase from contributing to the network, since he do not contribute per 
se. This extension to the model is to be considered as additional preferences in 
the agent’s utility function, as discussed under thesis objective, in (I). 
 
The agent’s extended utility function is then (1): 
 
                                            
 
For the agent to participate, utility from exerting effort less the corresponding 
disutility he faces cannot be negative. Also, for a positive effort level the utility 
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cannot be lower compared to the case with zero effort. The following incentive 
(2) and participation (3) constraint ensures this. 
 
                                                         
 
                                                                                   
    
The principal expects the following utility functions (4) and (5):  
 
                                    (4) 
 
when    , and 
 
                                    (5) 
 
if     .  
 
The timing of this contracting game is straight forward. (t=0): The principal offer 
the agent a contract. (t=1): The contract is accepted or refused by the agent. 
(t=2): An effort level is provided by the agent. (t=3): The lottery realizes the 
outcome. (t=4): Contract is executed. 
 
Laffont and Martimort (2002, 159)’s approach is used, where        and 
      . Equivalently,         and       . This assures concavity in         
since      is strictly convex. 
 
  denotes the benefit the principal receive when the contract is executed.      
and      is simplified to   and   respectively. The problem for the principal is 
then (6): 
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subject to (2) and (3). 
 
Solving the maximization problem (7) denoting   and    as the non-negative 
multipliers: (Appendix A) 
 
   
      
                          
                                       
                                   (7) 
 
F.O.C. writes: 
 
    
   
  
                  (8) 
        
                         (9) 
 
Rearranging equation (8) and (9); in addition, use of previous definition yields: 
 
 
    
  
 
    
  
  
                                                                                                   
 
       
    
  
    
                                                                                             
 
In the parentheses, denominator on LHS, of equation (10) and (11) are the 
second best optimal transfers   
  
    . 
 
The variables  
  
             are solutions to equation (2), (3), (10) and (11). 
Further, combining equation (10) and (11), results in an expression (12) which 
ascertains that participation constraint (3) is binding. 
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Parameter   needs to be strictly positive, and by combining equation (10) and 
(12), an expression with   writes: 
 
  
        
  
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
       
                                                                   
 
Since  
  
     
 
  
  , which can be confirmed by rearranging the incentive 
constraint (2), thus,  
  
     and the term within the brackets of equation (13) 
must be positive. In (13), the expression 
        
  
 is the principal’s information 
problem. A crucial link can be drawn between the information problem and the 
incentive constraint (2). First, by looking at the rearranged incentive 
constraint  
  
     
 
  
, one can observe that a smaller    reduces the 
distance between  
  
    . When    reduces, the information problem 
increases and for the principal it becomes harder to induce a high effort, as 
argued by (Laffont and Martimort 2002, 163): “ …differences in utilities 
  
  
     necessary to incentivize the agent  gets larger”. 
 
Laffont and Martimort (2002, 160) reach also the following proposition, similar 
to what discussed in chapter 2.1: 
 
When the agent is strictly risk averse, the optimal contract which induces 
effort saturates both the agent’s participation constraint and incentive 
constraint. This contract does not provide full information. 
 
Since the contract does not provide full information, is there some second best 
transfers which induce the agent to a positive effort level.  
 
From calculations, the corresponding second best transfers (14 and 15) writes: 
(Appendix B) 
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and, 
 
                          
          
  
                          
 
To better analyze the results one can specialize the model. Accordingly it is 
assumed that        
   
 
, where     is a measure of the agent’s degree of 
risk aversion. From the second best transfers one can now determine the 
principal’s second best cost (19):  
 
Define     
   and     
  , as respectively first best and second best cost expressions 
when only the agent exerts CET.  
 
       
  
          
                  (16) 
 
         
   
 
            
   
 
                                                       
 
Define               which represent the agent’s CET. 
 
    
     
 
           
     
  
 
            
     
   
 
 
 
  
        
 
       
     
  
 
        
     
   
 
 
 
                     
Rearrange (18), and insert for   yields (19): (Appendix C) 
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          (19) 
 
From (19) it is clear that the principal’s cost increases with the agent’s risk 
aversion. In addition, the information problem 
        
  
, induce some cost to the 
principal. This is already established knowledge in the contract theory literature. 
What is distinctive with (19) is that CET have a reducing effect on the principals 
cost, i.e. for a higher level of CET, the principal incurs less cost. This is simply 
because CET allows the principal to reduce his transfer to the agent. Looking at 
cost in the first best situation, this is even more clearly.  
 
Since first best cost under full information is simply the agent’s disutility     , 
first best cost is equal to (20): 
 
    
              
             
 
 
 
                                               
 
The whole information problem is gone, and for a risk neutral agent it is the 
agent’s disutility     and CET that determines first best cost.  
 
From     
   (19) and     
   (20), the agency cost can be calculated: 
 
              
       
   
             
 
        
      
                         
 
From (21), one can observe what creates the agency cost: The level of risk 
aversion, to what extent the principal is able to verify the stochastic output, and 
the level of CET. 
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4.2.1. Implications of CET as an additional preference 
From the model derivation we encounter several interesting findings; findings 
that clarify some of the initial questions, but also findings which raises new 
questions and guide us further in the process. The first evident limitation of this 
model is the difficulty to capture the mechanisms from a network in a model 
with only one principal and one agent. Nevertheless, our intention in this stage 
of the thesis is to identify agent behavior when additional properties are 
assigned, compared to the initial model. Considering the agent’s utility function, 
it is obvious that for any positive intrinsic valuation of the network membership 
an agent will get increased utility for a positive effort level, as long as    . 
Since the intrinsic preferences are linked to the initial effort level, CET are 
necessarily also a function of effort.  
 
The effect from CET can be straight forward: CET have a dampening effect on 
disutility. A natural question arises: Is it necessary to model CET as an additional 
term in the utility function? Since CET are intrinsic preferences, it needs to be 
queried whether these value considerations are likely to be endowed to the 
agent, together with disutility. Accordingly, if the disutility parameter implicit 
capture this dampening effect per se. It can be argued that the answer is 
twofold. If you consider the network as a static network, and at the same time 
consider the dampening effect on disutility from network contribution as 
exogenous given and endowed to the agent, then the answer is no. Henrich et al. 
(2001) find from a series of behavioral economic experiments that economic 
preferences are much more likely to be shaped by day to day economic and 
social interactions, than being exogenous determined. Following Henrich et al. 
(2001)’s suggestions, the answer to the question above can in fact be yes. Since 
organizations exchange ties can shape own behavior (Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 
2000), the size of   in this case, it is more likely that CET need to be separated 
from disutility. Consequently, CET is dynamic, and takes into account a changing 
economic environment. However, CET is in the model considered as constants, 
thus it cannot change in any of the game sequences, unless this is specified.   
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Aligning this with Powell (1990)’s theory, our CET parameter,    can vary as the 
conflict resolution method in within the network change. Stronger CET treatment 
implies stronger intrinsic network valuation. Further, as the normative basis is 
more concerned with complementary strength and agent’s become more 
interdependent, gain and contribution from and in the network will increase,     
and    respectively. Speculating, this is presumably the case when the network 
gets more embedded and CET grows stronger. Following the same reasoning, our 
agent will have lower utility gain for the same actions as the network becomes 
weaker and provides less of a benefit to its members.  
 
Comparing our findings with the initial model (22), it is clear that as long as the 
agent has emphasis on CET the principal has lower agency cost, given the same 
level of effort. 
 
          
             
 
        
      
  
           
      
                
 
Accordingly, agency cost is decreasing as CET gets stronger (Appendix D): 
 
          
  
   
                            
   
                        
 
So far, we have established a more or less intuitive result in proposition one:  
 
Proposition one: If CET is treated as an additional preference, it yields a higher 
utility for a maximizing agent if    . Everything else equal, CET reduces agency 
cost and improves the second best outcome. 
 
This result has additional implications important to our analysis. If the only effect 
is that agency cost is reduced, the principal extracts the whole material value 
emerging from the network, i.e. the reduced agency cost. This can be in conflict 
with the very fundamentals of embedded networks. One distinction is important 
to make however; it is not the lack of material reward in itself (additional 
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transfers due to reduced agency cost) that breaks with reciprocity, but the lack of 
reciprocal behavior per se.  Recall definition three, and how economics of 
reciprocity discuss how individuals no longer are concerned with purely selfish 
behavior. To clarify (Fehr and Gachter 2000, 160): 
 
…in the case of reciprocity, the actor is responding to friendly or hostile 
actions even if no material gains can be expected. 
 
However, from the theoretical framework, the only possibility the principal has 
to award the agent, because of CET, is from an additional transfer, as a “bonus”. 
When the principal extracts the whole benefit he is clearly a self-interested utility 
maximizing actor with no altruism at all. The fact that the principal is not allowed 
to reward the agent in the current model, guides us further in the analysis. In this 
sense, the model needs additional extensions to better reflect CET. We will now 
analyze a situation where the principal can in fact reciprocate towards the agent. 
 
4.3. Extensions to the basic model: Bilateral complex exchange ties 
In this section the same theoretical framework is used, but with some additional 
modifications. Bilateral CET is now considered. Both the principal and the agent 
are now allowed to increase their utility with CET. This is more likely to reflect 
the reality in embedded networks, since the mean of communication is 
relational, and actor preferences is argued to be interdependent (Powell 1990).  
First of all, consider           and           from (22) which is the change in 
agency cost for the principal. This is straight forward and defined as:  
  
      
                                   (24) 
 
Now, let us assume that if the principal is concerned with CET, he will act in a 
reciprocal manner towards the agent based on a constant sharing-rule . This, 
allows him to split the reduced agency cost with the agent. Further, for an 
altruistic principal      and for a self-interested principal   . However,   
can also have intermediate values representing a principal ranging between self-
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interested and altruistic, preferring reciprocal actions accordingly. Sharing some 
of the saved agency cost with the agent, gives the principal additional utility 
if   , and the transfer to the agent therefore becomes either         or 
        
 
If the principal has preferences of CET, then the following utility functions (25) 
and (26) applies, and he faces the following maximization problem (27):  
 
                                                (25) 
 
when    , and 
 
                                             (26) 
 
   
       
                                                                      
 
subject to (2) and (3). The timing of the game is equivalent to the previous 
maximization problem. 
 
Define      
  , as the cost second best expression for bilateral CET.  
 
The corresponding new second best cost function writes (28): 
 
     
               
             
 
 
 
             
 
        
      
      
                      (28) 
 
We see from the maximization problem (27) that there will be no change to the 
explicit transfers needed to elicit effort from the agent, since F.O.C. (8 and 9) 
remains unchanged. 
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It is assumed that the principal ex post output realization can estimate his gain 
from CET. This allows him to observe his change in agency cost     (calculated 
using expression (24)), which in the specialized model is equal to (29):  
 
    
           
      
 
             
 
        
      
 
           
 
        
      
  
          (29) 
 
The last term on RHS of (29) indicates the cost reduction due to CET.  
 
4.3.1. Implications of CET as an additional preference 
From the expression below (30) one can observe that whether the agency cost is 
different from the initial model, depends on the principals’ sharing rule   
 
                
             
 
        
      
 
  
           
 
        
      
  
           
      
                              
 
The optimal choice of the sharing-rule , depends on what type the principal 
really is; If he gets utility from CET or not.  A self-interested principal will always 
have    . As demonstrated in section 4.2.1, he can then extract the whole 
benefit emerging in the network. On the other hand, if the principal is 
completely altruistic he will have     for maximized utility. When     the 
agent will receive the principal’s whole benefit from CET, i.e. all saved agency 
cost due to CET will be transferred to the agent. For an altruistic principal, 
comparing costs, the principal’s material wellbeing is equal to what it is in the 
initial model, as shown below (31). From (25) one can see that his utility is 
higher, however. 
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From expression (31), one can observe that          is positive 
whenever   . Hence, in a delegation situation where both the agent and 
principal have preference on CET; the following proposition can be inferred.  
 
Proposition two: From (31) we see that as long as the principal has   , i.e. do 
not behave completely altruistic, there will be a Pareto improvement from CET 
since                     , and neither the agent nor the principal are worse 
off. 
 
The subtle with this model analysis, is that the principal’s cost and utility goes in 
opposite directions, but the principal will never be worse for any value of . If 
    there will be no efficiency gain, since the principal give away the whole 
benefit from CET. On the other hand, the full efficiency gain will be in the case of 
a self-interested principal, which give the following proposition:  
 
Proposition three: The social optimum occurs when the self-interested principal 
extracts the whole reduction in agency cost, when   . 
 
An additional point to make is that a self-interested agent will never have 
anything to gain from mimicking CET. Recall the principal’s benefit from CET: 
 
    
           
 
        
      
                                                                         
 
If the agent mimics CET there will be no change in agency cost, hence      . 
Consequently, the agent will not benefit from this, since      . This makes it 
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evident that a self-interested agent can in fact crowd out a principal concerned 
with CET. Simply since      , even if   . 
 
Proposition four: An agent without CET will crowd out a principal’s CET. 
 
4.3.2. Implications of CET as external motivations from the economic 
environment 
So far, the agent and the principal have unconditionally exerted CET, not 
depending on each other’s type. Consider now instead the following scenario: 
 
Both the principal and the agent can communicate their CET to each other. This 
is done by sending out a simple signal, which the other part can pick up. The 
signal contains information to what extent the actor is concerned with CET, but it 
is not binding neither to the principal nor the agent. In other words, committing 
to CET is voluntarily and reflects the actor’s type and behavioral responses to the 
economic environment. We assume that the agent can increase his utility from 
CET; however his utility is conditioned on the principal’s commitment to CET. If 
the principal does not commit to CET it will impose a disutility to the agent. 
However, if the principal commits to CET the agent will have a utility increase 
from CET. Hence, the agent is still a utility maximizing agent. However, he has a 
choice whether to exert CET or not based on the signal from the principal. We 
will not consider the corresponding adverse selection problem, but discuss the 
possibility where the agent finds the signal credible due to the economic 
environment, as discussed in (II) on page 13. The principal’s preference to CET is 
initially unknown, but   can be  .  Consider now the agent’s utility function, 
and the according conditions: 
 
                                      (33) 
 
Where, 
 
   , in (t=0) 
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However, in (t=5):  
   , if observed    
   , if observed    
  
The following timing applies to this game: 
 
(t=0): The principal offers the agent a contract with the transfers   and  . (t=1): 
The agent accepts or refuses the contract. (t=2): The agent signals   to the 
principal, and the principal signals   to the agent. However, the principal’s real 
  is not yet observable to the agent. (t=3): The agent exerts an effort 
conditioned on the explicit contract. The agent needs to choose if he behaves 
according to CET or not, based on the signal from the principal in (t=2). (t=4): 
Outcome is realized. (t=5): The principal executes the contract with the transfer 
       or       ; the agent observes   and gets a utility according to , 
dependent on  . 
 
The agent’s challenge is to determine the credibility of the signal he receives 
from the principal. Ex ante contract execution the agent can never be sure the 
principal will actually commit to CET. The principal can mimic CET to reduce his 
agency cost, hence take advantage of the agent’s CET. Since CET is not a credible 
condition there is obviously a risk of moral hazard from the principal’s side, now 
facing the agent. From section 4.2.1, we know that                       when 
the agent has preference on CET. Thus, it will always be optimal for the principal 
also to signal CET, no matter what type he is. If the principal mimics CET he can 
always extract the reduced agency cost, and the fair principal can on the other 
hand reward the agent, as discussed in the previous section. In other words, it is 
optimal to both a committing and mimicking principal to respond to the agent’s 
signal with a positive . This reasoning is supported by Fehr and Schmidt (2000), 
which find evidence in their data on implicit versus explicit contractual choices.  
 
Despite the credibility problem, “bonus contracts” with a voluntarily bonus 
payment is a familiar approach in behavioral economics (see (Fehr, Klein, and 
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Schmidt 2001). The reason can be, as discussed in (II); individuals’ optimal 
behavior can be altered due to some external influence. 
 
In section 4.2.1, the agent is more or less altruistic since he unconditionally 
reduces the principal’s agency cost. Due to the uncertain credibility of the 
principal’s signal, the agent is faced the question: Will the principal commit to 
CET? Related to the credibility problem, is the difficulty of governing CET. 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986a)’s principle of how dual entitlements1 
govern community standards of fairness can guide us in this discussion. If we 
apply the principal, not to a reference transaction or reference profit but to 
reference behavior, this can explain how network form of organization can be 
governed. Also, the behavioral decisions made by economic agents. A history of 
CET practice can serve as a reference behavior in the community. Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986a, 731) state that: 
 
…people expect a substantial level of conformity to community standards 
– and also that they adapt their views of fairness to the norms of actual 
behavior.         
 
Consequently, pro-social behavior can function as a norm which actors expect 
and behave according to. In this sense, principals concerned with CET need to be 
present, before behavior according to such preferences is considered as a norm. 
As shortly commented in section 2.3, the presence of fair principals is to a large 
extent confirmed by experimental research. Fehr and Schmidt (2000, 1058) state 
that: 
 
First of all, and most importantly, the presence of fair principals implies 
that the promised bonus does not merely represent cheap talk because 
fair principals can and do in fact condition the bonus payment on the 
effort level. 
 
                                                 
1
 “A firm is not allowed to increase its profits by arbitrarily violating the entitlement of its 
transactors to the reference price, rent or wage” (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986a, 729-
730). 
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Further, Akerlof (1980) shows how fair wages can explain involuntarily 
unemployment, i.e. how social customs which is not necessarily individually 
optimal will sustain, if the damage from possible reputational consequences is 
severe enough. Akerlof (1980)’s findings might explain how the reputational 
concerns can sustain the code of behavior in embedded networks. 
 
Aligning this with the governing mechanisms in networks form of economic 
organization from table 1, reputational concerns and reciprocal actions, it can be 
argued that the agent is likely to believe that the principal signal his real 
behavior, thus he will commit to CET with   . Generalizing Larson (1992, 
98)’s statement on entrepreneurial network dyads, can underpin this inference: 
 
They were governed in important ways by social controls arising from 
norms of trust and reciprocity. Governance was explained in large part by 
understanding the subtle control of interdependent and self-regulated 
players engaged in and committed to mutual gains. An explanation of 
governance is captured by certain aspects of institutional theory that 
acknowledge patterned histories of interaction that create mutual 
expectations.  
 
Another possibility is that a self-interested principal will crowd-out agent’s with 
CET. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) show that this can be the case when the economic 
environment consists of both fair and un-fair actors. It turns out that fair agent’s 
are afraid that the principals will not commit to the implicit contract. Therefore, 
they choose an effort level no higher than needed to fulfill the explicit contract. 
From the agent’s utility function (33) and according conditions, it will then be 
optimal for the agent to choose     in (t=2). 
 
The two arguments create a possibility where implicit contracts also can too be 
founded on the social norm in the economic environment, and is less likely to 
have an effect in isolated cases. In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) shows 
that the strategic economic environment and the distribution of preferences is 
important to the outcome. If a fraction of the members care for fair outcomes it 
can crowd in such considerations to other, and in some cases to all, actors in the 
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environment – just as fair preferences can be crowded out by self-interest. In this 
sense, it can be argued that CET emerging in embedded networks can be 
modeled as an implicit argument, and still have an effect on the outcome. This 
reasoning depends on the idea that the strategic economic environment can in 
fact alter individual behavior. Accordingly, despite the risk of moral hazard which 
will result in a lower utility, the agent exerts CET. 
 
Conjecture one: The presence of network members with CET can establish such 
preferences as a social norm, and thereby induce the agent to behave according 
to CET preferences. 
 
Contrasting the outcomes from the previous model specifications in section 
4.3.1, we see it is harder to achieve Pareto-improvements in the latter. Also that 
such improvements rest on behavioral judgments that are not considered 
optimal for the mainstream economic actor.   
 
Proposition five: When conjecture one applies, proposition two is valid if   . 
 
However, if the principal has no preference to CET, despite the social norm, we 
observe from (33) that CET will make the agent worse off than compared to the 
initial model. Consequently, since    and    . 
 
Proposition six: If conjecture one is valid, the agent is worse off with CET 
preferences if   , and the principal’s self-interests is consequently Pareto-
damaging. 
 
4.4. Two periods and punishment 
In this part of the analysis we take into account fully reciprocal actions, as stated 
in definition three; the fact that a reciprocal agent is willing to punish unfair 
behaviour. The following discussion also applies to (III) in our thesis objective; 
that individuals optimize according to the consequences of a possible 
punishment due to behavioural deviations. This reasoning follows equilibrium 
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strategy specifications in game theory; where a deviation from equilibrium will 
be punished – accordingly, a potential punishment deter such behavior (Sobel 
2005). However, due to definition three in the thesis objective, a crucial 
behavioral assumption is that a punishment will occur even if it is not a multiple 
equilibrium outcome.  
 
In the case of a mimicking principal, the agent will be willing to forego some 
material wealth to punish the principal. It is assumed that the agent will not have 
a utility from punishing the principal; his behaviour judgement is now based on 
reciprocity. In other words, the agent will punish the principal despite the fact 
that this is costly to him. Contrasted to a pure utility maximizing agent, this 
punishment will never be optimal.  Due to the timing of the game, the only 
opportunity the agent has to punish the principal is in a later period. Therefore, a 
two period game is now considered. It is assumed that the principal has no 
outside options during the two periods. This is perhaps an unrealistic 
assumption, but it can also reflect that organizing economic activity in embedded 
networks make the total and individual output dependent on the network’s 
distribution of asset-specific know-how. Not having access to the network’s 
know-how anymore can, practically speaking, limits the production possibility 
set. Also, one can argue that such an assumption is realistic, based on Powel 
(1990, 305)’s statement: 
 
Parties to network forms of exchange have lost some of their ability to 
dictate their own future and are increasingly dependent on the activities 
of others.  
 
An additional assumption is that the agent needs to verify the principal’s 
commitment to CET. Again, due to the model setup, the only way the principal 
can commit to CET is by sharing some of the saved agency cost. It is assumed 
that agency cost is private information to the principal. A problem is now the 
agent’s unawareness of the actual agency cost. Due to this uncertainty, the agent 
will not necessarily succeed to reveal a principal that mimics CET. It is assumed 
that this uncertainty only applies when the principal mimics CET. Therefore, the 
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principal does not face the possibility of being wrongly punished in a later period. 
This assumption is based on the following reasoning:  A principal with CET will be 
more transparent in his information handling, compared to a self-interested 
principal. Thus, a principal with CET want to share his private information, like 
agency cost, with the agent. However, this is not something the principal is 
obligated to do. Therefore, the agent cannot assume that a principal with CET 
will do this. However, it should be in the CET concerned principal’s interest to do 
so; to secure the possible benefits from CET. Consequently, the agent will 
recognize a committing principal if he observes one, however he do not know 
this ex ante. 
  
According to definition two, the strength of the CET is still considered as 
dynamic. A more embedded network yields stronger CET, however CET remain 
constant during the game. Uzzi (1997) finds that a higher level of embeddedness 
facilitate more fine grained information transfers between economic actors. Such 
fine-grained information is claimed to be more detailed, tacit and holistic than 
price data. Due to this, we assume that for more fine-grained information 
transfers, it is easier for the agent to estimate the principal’s agency cost. 
Consequently, the agent is more likely to determine the principal’s agency cost 
as the network become more embedded, and vice versa. To reflect this in the 
analysis, we assume that the principal is faced with a probability whether the 
agent will be able to determine his agency cost or not. If the agent can determine 
the agency cost he will be able to reveal the principal’s real type. It is therefore 
assumed; when the principal mimics CET the agent will reveal his type with the 
probability  . Based on the discussions above we assume that a more embedded 
network increases the probability  . 
 
In addition, the agent has a perception of what is fair behavior. From 
experimental research with ultimatum game, it is evident that there is usually 
some minimum level which the participant considers as fair. Translating this into 
our setting, the principal cannot choose a positive but neglectable low   to 
satisfy CET. Further, the size of , or the level of commitment to CET from the 
principal, needs to be perceived as fair from the agent’s point of view. The agent 
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can signal this perceived level to the principal. We define this as the minimum 
fairness constraint 
 
 
, where     (34). Hence, 
 
 
 gives the minimum value of the 
sharing rule , which the agent will consider as a commitment to CET. The 
minimum fairness constraint writes:  
 
  
 
 
  , where                      (34)    
 
The following analysis applies to the case when an agent with CET preferences is 
faced with a self-interested principal. Since a principal committing to CET will 
never be subject to punishment, this is not relevant to analyse. 
 
Consider again the principal’s initial utility functions: 
 
                                              (35) 
 
and, 
 
                                              (36) 
 
If the self-interested principal commits to CET his utility will instead be    
        , if we isolate     from    and  . The principal’s net benefit from CET 
is          since he only obtains increased utility from the material benefit, 
not from acting fair per se, like in chapter 4.3.  
 
The agent’s utility function is:  
 
                                      (37) 
 
Where,  
 
   , in (t=0) 
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However, in (t=5) period one:  
   , if observed       
   , if observed       
 
The agent will have the same utility in period two as in the end of period one. 
This makes the incentive feasible contract more costly to the principal if    . 
 
The new element in this part, as discussed above, is that the principal can be 
punished by the agent’s reciprocal behavior. A punishment has the following 
consequences: The agent will punish the principal in the second period. The only 
way the agent can punish the principal is to deliberately play the zero-effort 
game, despite the incentive feasible contract offers. Therefore, the principal is 
faced with the problem if he should mimic or commit to CET.  
 
Consider now the following timing of this game: 
 
Period one:  
(t=0): The principal offers the agent a contract with the possible transfers   and  . 
(t=1): The agent accepts or refuses the contract. (t=2): The agent exerts an effort. 
(t=3): Outcome is realized. (t=4): The principal executes the contract with the 
transfer        or        if he commits to CET, or    or   if he mimic’s CET. 
(t=5): The agent learns the principal’s type if he commits. If the principal mimics, 
the agent reveal his type with the probability    
 
Period two: 
(t=0): The principal offers the agent the same incentive feasible contract with the 
transfers   and  . (t=1): The agent accepts or refuses the contract. (t=2): The 
agent decides whether to exert CET or punish the principal, based on (t=5) in 
period one. The agent exerts an effort conditioned on (t=2) period two. (t=3): 
Outcome is realized. (t=4): The principal executes the contract with the transfer 
       or        if he commits to CET, or only   or   if he mimics CET.  
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The principal is still maximizing his problem, (6), w.r.t. (2) and (3), but in addition 
he needs to decide whether he should commit to CET or not in (t=4) period one. 
In other words, the principal want to maximize the discounted sum of two single 
period payoffs. Consequently the principal will choose the outcome which gives 
him the highest expected value over both periods. We assume that the 
consequence of his actions, choice of    , on the agent’s utility function is 
public information.  The principal will commit to CET if this gives him a higher 
value than if he mimics CET. In formal terms, if: 
 
                                                                                                                    
 
If the principal decides to mimic CET his value function (39) writes as follow: 
 
                                                                
 
The principal will be revealed with the probability  . If this is the case, the 
principal will in the first period obtain the utility       . However, in the next 
period the agent are willing to forego some material value to punish the principal 
due to his unfair behavior. To punish the principal the agent deliberately plays 
the zero-effort game in the next period, despite his incentive feasible contract 
offers. Denoting the principals discount factor with   
 
   
, where   is the 
discount rate, gives the principal a utility of     in the following period. On the 
other hand, the agent does not succeed in revealing the principal’s type with the 
probability        and the principal receives        in both periods. 
 
4.4.1. Commitment in two periods 
We discuss the principal’s choice based on two different scenarios. First, we 
consider a case where the principal will commit to CET in both periods, before 
we in the next subsection inquire commitment only in one period.  
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If the principal commits to CET he will receive utility from   in addition to his net 
benefit from CET,           in both periods: Denoting  
       , as 
committing in both periods. 
 
                                                                                           
 
Based on inequality (38), it is optimal for the principal to commit to CET if (39) < 
(40): 
 
                                                     
                   (41) 
 
Solve inequality (41) w.r.t.  yields (42): (Appendix E)  
 
  
 
   
 
     
                                                                                      
 
Since a self-interested principal will never choose a higher   than strictly 
necessary we can consider (34) with equality, thus we get: 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
     
                                                                                       
 
From (43) it is clear that the principal will commit to CET, if the share of saved 
agency cost he needs to forgo is lower than the probability weighted loss from 
being punished relative to the saved agency cost. His expected payoff is then 
(40), and his net benefit from the agent’s CET is              . 
 
Proposition seven: The principal commits to CET if the minimum-fairness 
constraint is less costly than the expected loss from punishment.   
 
We see from (43), that a higher level of embeddedness in the network, 
consequently also a higher probability  , will increase the RHS. This because 
more fine-grained information transfers make it more likely that the agent will 
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be able to revile his type, hence the probability weighted loss becomes larger. 
We see from (44) that this can induce the principal to commit to CET since the 
RHS side of (43) increase with   (Appendix F). 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
             
            
        
                                
 
On the other hand, from (45) it is clear that there is a negative relationship 
between saved agency cost and the principal’s willingness to commit to CET. This 
can be explained from the fact that the more the principal saves in agency cost 
today, the more he is willing to accept a punishment tomorrow. From (45) it is 
evident that the expected loss relative to the saved agency cost decreases and 
make it less attractive to commit to CET (Appendix F). 
 
 
    
 
 
   
 
   
              
         
        
                                 
 
A present oriented principal put weight on the future happenings with a low 
discount factor. On the other side, a future oriented principal will put weight on 
the future happenings with a high discount factor. Thus, for an increasing 
discount factor the principal puts more weight on the possible loss due to the 
punishment from the agent. From (46) we see that a higher discount factor can 
induce the principal to commit to CET (Appendix F).   
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
             
            
         
                                
 
One can also observe from (43) that a bigger difference between         
and   , i.e. a more painful punishment, makes it more attractive for the principal 
to commit to CET, since the RHS of (43) increases. 
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4.4.2. Commitment in one period 
Now, let’s allow the principal to change his choice from period one to period 
two. Intuitively, this should be desirable to the principal since he can in period 
two mimic CET without the risk of facing any punishment from the agent. 
 
In this case, the principal faces the following value function (47) from committing 
to CET: Denoting            as committing in one period. 
 
                                                                                     
 
Now the inequality                 writes (39) < (47):  
 
                                                          
               
Solve the inequality (48) w.r.t.  yields (49): (Appendix G) 
 
  
  
   
                                                                                                     
 
With the minimum fairness constraint (34): 
 
 
 
 
  
   
                                                                                                      
 
If (50) holds, his expected payoff is (47), and his net benefit from the agent’s CET 
is              . Propositions seven and the discussed effects of changes 
in    ,   and   applies also to (50). 
 
From (51) we see what is also intuitive, that the value of commitment is larger in 
the case where the principal is allowed to change his type from period one to 
period two, hence                  , simply because he extracts the whole 
benefit from CET in period two.  
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When comparing (43) and (50) in (52) we find that; if the principal is allowed to 
commit only in the first period and then mimics in the second period, it is more 
probable that he in fact will commit in period one. This, because he expects a 
higher payoff in period two than if he commits only in one period, compared to 
committing in both. Due to this, the net loss from the agent’s punishment is 
more severe. So, to secure        in the second period he commits in period 
one if (50) holds.  
 
 
   
 
   
             
  
   
                                                       
 
From the analysis we can infer that a utility maximizing principal can always 
mimic CET in the second period. Thus, the agent has only the ability to affect the 
principal’s behavior in the first period. However, as discussed in section 4.3.2, 
the principal can be induced to behave according to CET due to some external 
motivations. 
 
Proposition eight: A punishment from the agent can induce the principal to 
commit to CET in the first period only. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we combine fundamental behavioural assumptions in network 
form of economic organization and a principal-agent model framework. We use 
theory from both mainstream economics and behavioural economics, to 
compare and contrast the possible outcomes. From behavioural economics two 
different approaches is used: We model extra preferences in the utility functions 
and discuss possible deviations from what would usually be optimal behaviour 
due to some external motivation. 
 
Extending the initial model framework, according to the definitions of CET, we 
find that agency-problems in network form of economic organization yield 
improved second-best outcomes. Compared to what the initial model yields in a 
traditional market transaction, incorporating additional psychological 
mechanisms can make the model more applicable to embedded networks. 
Improved second best outcomes are first and foremost due to the prevailing 
mechanisms in embedded networks: Social preferences, interdependences and 
influence of social norms. Aligning our results, we see that it becomes harder to 
obtain improved second-best results as we move from independent to 
interdependent preferences. The case with the least possible improved 
outcomes is when the economic environment can influence the agent’s 
behaviour. In addition, we see that the agent’s possible influence on the 
principal’s preference for CET is not straight forward, and is likely to be limited.   
 
Our results show that extra modelling can in fact improve the outcome of the 
coordination problem, however one need to be aware of several shortcomings. 
Following our approach, it is more or less possible to model in various aspects, as 
long as you have a sound argument to do so. This reduces the validity of such an 
analysis. Also, to what extent our results are verifiable through statistical testing 
is debatable. We generalize quite complex psychological and behaviour 
mechanisms into a few variables, which probably make it difficult to reproduce 
the outcome with other methods. Another limitation concerning our analysis is 
the fact that we only use two possible effort levels, 0 and 1. An “extra” effort due 
to social preferences is perhaps more likely to reflect reality, and is more 
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consistent with general findings in behavioural economics. We made a decision 
to use two effort levels because of the mathematical and conceptual complexity 
of an analysis with continuous effort levels. From the perspective in this thesis, 
few negative aspects of embedded networks have been considered. In particular, 
one feature of embedded networks is important to economic analysis: Uzzi 
(1996)’s finding that there exists some threshold. Surpassing this, negative 
returns can emerge from the network, which in turn undermine the discussed 
benefits in embedded networks. 
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Appendix A 
 
Calculations related to the principals maximization problem: 
 
F.O.C. writes the following: 
    
   
  
                   
        
                      
 
Rearrange the F.O.C. yields: 
 
    
  
 
    
  
  
         (1) 
 
       
    
  
    
         (2) 
 
Multiplying equation (1) with   , and (2) with       :  
  
 
    
  
 
               (3) 
      
 
       
                  (4) 
 
Combining equation (3) and (4), and solving for  : 
  
  
    
  
 
 
    
       
          (5) 
 
Finding an expression for   with use of equation (5), inserted for  , in either (1) 
or (2):  
 
    
  
 
 
  
    
  
 
 
    
       
  
  
  
        (6) 
 
Rearrange equation (6) and multiply with   , and solving for  : 
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Appendix B  
 
Calculating the expressions for  
  
       : 
 
Incentive constraint: 
                                      (1) 
Participation constraint:  
                               (2) 
 
Solving for  , using the incentive constraint (1): 
                              
                      
  
           
  
           (3) 
 
Inserting  , into the participation constraint (2): 
   
           
  
                          
 
Define:               
 
   
 
  
                
 
Multiplying with   , and solving for  : 
                          
              
      
 
  
         (4) 
 
Inserting for   into (3), and solve for  : 
  
 
  
     
 
  
 
          
 
  
         (5) 
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Final expressions, inserted for   into (4) and (5), based on defined concepts 
(       and       . Equivalently         and       )) yields: 
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Appendix C 
 
Calculating the second best cost expression: 
 
Assume that        
   
 
. Further, inserted for expressions  
  
 and      
(Appendix B) and definition that              , the cost second best 
function writes: 
 
    
                
 
  
  
          
 
  
 
 
 
              
 
  
 
      
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
    
       
          
 
   
 
 
       
      
 
   
 
 
 
 
    
     
    
 
 
 
            
 
      
 
   
 
 
       
 
      
 
    
 
 
 
         
 
      
 
 
    
     
   
 
   
   
      
   
       
 
      
   
       
 
      
 
       
 
      
 
 
    
     
   
 
   
   
      
 
       
 
      
 
 
    
     
   
 
 
           
      
 
 
Final expression cost second best inserted for   writes: 
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Appendix D 
 
Derivation of           w.r.t.  : 
 
          
             
 
        
      
 
 
          
  
 
             
 
        
      
   
 
Solving the derivation problem: 
                                      
     
         
 
 
Final expression: 
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Appendix E 
 
Solving the principals optimal  with use of the inequality                 : 
The principal’s value functions with mimicking CET and committing CET: 
 
                                           
 
                            
 
Solving : 
                                                      
 
Dividing with      : 
             
     
                             
 
Multiplying out the parentheses and moving   to the LHS: 
              
             
     
 
 
Factor out   and      . In addition, dividing with     final expression writes: 
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Appendix F 
Derivation of expression related to chapter 4:  
 
Derivation w.r.t.  : 
 
  
 
 
   
 
     
               
 
                                     
          
    
 
 
  
 
            
        
   
 
Derivation w.r.t.    : 
 
    
 
 
   
 
     
               
 
                               
          
    
 
 
    
  
         
        
   
 
Derivation w.r.t.  : 
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Appendix G 
 
Solving the principal’s optimal , with use of the inequality                 : 
The principal’s value functions with mimicking CET, and change in period two 
committing CET: 
 
                                           
 
                               
 
Solving : 
                                                  
 +    
 
Multiplying out the parentheses and moving   to the LHS: 
                      
 
Factor out   and  . In addition, dividing with     final expression writes: 
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Summary 
 
The intention with this preliminary thesis report is to give a brief introduction to 
our research subject with an aim to boil the discussion down to a research 
question. We will give a brief account of the format of our thesis in terms of 
methodology and further work progress.  
 
Our overall interest lies in agent behavior in economic transactions. We 
therefore start out by describing how economic transactions are organized in 
either markets or in hierarchies founded on the work of Coase (1937) and later 
extended by Williamson (1975).  Agents are identified as economic utilitarian’s, 
where some are subject to opportunistic behavior. Thus, the agents seek to get 
“the largest piece of the pie”. These problems are often analyzed in terms of 
agency theory which later will be our theoretical tool for analysis. According to 
Hart (1995) agency theory is not concerned with firm boarders and has 
applicability in various contexts. This has implications for the future thesis.  
 
Powell (1990) introduces network as a form of economic organization which 
differ from markets and hierarchies. When firms are embedded in such networks 
interdependence and relationships play a larger role, and it’s claimed that agency 
costs are reduced. The strategic implications of this are not considered, but the 
discussion is aligned with economic theory.  
 
The second part of the report completes the link between embedded networks 
and agency theory. An economic model with incentive feasible contracts in a 
moral hazard environment is presented, before we conclude with a research 
question. At last, some remarks about similar approaches and motivation.                
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Foundations in transaction cost economics 
In economic analysis and other scholar disciplines studying social and 
organizational behavior it is well known that contracting situations is likely to 
induce costs on to the agents involved. Costs ascend from designing the contract 
as well from enforcement  (Williamson 1981).  In his classic article "The Nature of 
the Firm" Coase (1937) argues that contracting difficulties is at the very core of 
firm existence. Discovery of prices, i.e. costs related to bargaining and conclusion 
of contracts will be internalized in the firm rather than being transaction specific. 
Thus, organizing exchange transactions in firms rather than markets reduce 
contractual costs and change the character of the contract. Williamson (1991) 
identifies markets and firms as governance structures that are supported by 
different forms of contract law. It can be understood that contractual law is the 
mean to govern transactional relations between agents. In other words: the 
character of the contract.  
 
Classical contract law is the governing mean in a market transaction; much 
economic theory is founded on this. Here we find “thick” markets in which 
“…individual buyers and sellers bear no dependency relation to each other. 
Instead, each party can go its own way at negligible cost to another” (Williamson 
1991, 271). Transactions in “thick” markets will in an ideal world be “sharp in by 
clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance” (Macneil 1974, 738). This 
reflects the character of the contract; very legalistic, hard bargaining, strict 
enforcement with autonomous agents. 
 
A firm can be thought of as a continuation of the market relation; however the 
mean to govern the contractual relations is that of forbearance (Williamson 
1991). An illustration can be the comparison of a seller and a buyer with an 
employer and employee. The former transaction will take place in a market and 
the latter in a hierarchy. The point being that the properties in the contractual 
respect is comparable; however, the contractual law differs. Ultimately, the firm 
can be described as a “nexus of contracts” where the hierarchy is its own court 
of law (Williamson 1991). Transaction cost economizing is not subject to 
discussion in this thesis report. The underlying principles in how agents relate to 
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the transaction and the contracting situation are of importance to our thesis, 
however.  
 
In both markets and hierarchies many of the underlying assumptions in the 
transaction, and especially the contracting difficulties, are the same. Agency 
theory illuminates this and has applicability in both individual, group and 
organizational context (Wright, Mukherji, and Kroll 2001). This will have 
implications on the further discussion towards a research question. One 
distinction is important to make: While transaction costs economics consider the 
fact that writing the contract is costly, agency theory ascribes most contracting 
cost to observing variables of interest (Hart 1995). Further, transaction cost 
economics contributes with determinants of firm boundaries as opposed to 
agency theory which incorporates incentive considerations into firm analysis. It is 
of interest that many of the behavioral, both human and organizational, 
assumptions harmonize between the two levels of analysis. Williamson (1981, 
533) state the following assumption which transaction cost rely on: “…that at 
least some agents are given to opportunism.” In terms of agency theory 
Eisenhardt (1989) also identifies self-interest as  human assumptions. Wright et 
al. (2001) discuss how economic utilitarianism make it more evident that both 
principals and agents are concerned with utility maximization. Noreen (1988, 
360) draw the link between utilitarianism and self-interest which he argue leads 
to opportunistic behavior; “Utilitarian ethical behavior,[…], has to do with 
voluntary compliance with rules that are, in some sense, in the individual's own 
self-interest.” Consequently this implies that the level of congruency or conflict 
between the principal and agent depends on the goal orientation and reciprocity 
in the relationship. 
 
The costs from contracting problems in agency theory has its foundations in 
information economics, and are due to information asymmetries (Eisenhardt 
1989). Often, the literature discriminate  between information problems as 
either hidden action or hidden information (Mas-Colell, Green, and Whinston 
1995, 477): 
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“The hidden action case, also known as moral hazard, is illustrated by the 
owner’s inability to observe how hard his manager is working; the 
manager’s coming to possess superior information about the firm’s 
opportunities, on the other hand, is an example of hidden information.”  
 
Hart (1995, 27-28) raise the question what will happened to the agency related 
costs when governing structures change in the case of a firm merger. He states 
the following: 
 
“I argue that it is unsatisfactory to assume that informational structure 
changes directly as a result of a merger. In the same way, it is 
unsatisfactory to suppose that the agents automatically become less 
opportunistic.”  
 
This seem plausible when treating the firm as a continuation of the market (as 
above), and keeping the discussed assumptions intact. But is this always 
feasible? Due to the complexity of contractual problems Williamson (1981, 533) 
imply that “There is a tendency, however, to accept this fact [complexity] as 
given rather than inquire into the reason for it” and that “What is needed, I 
submit, is more self-conscious attention to “human nature as we know it.”” 
Accordingly, Wright et al. (2001) argue that the agency theory has its limitation 
of being narrow due to its assumptions, which the authors claim, make it less 
reflective of realities in economic relationships. More precise (Wright, Mukherji, 
and Kroll 2001, 414):  
 
“…the restrictive assumptions of agency theory discount the possibility 
that diverse individuals in various situations may behave differently”  
 
Economic transactions in embedded networks 
Analyzing contractual difficulties in “thick” markets with the assumption of 
atomistic relationships might not always reflect real life and “human nature as 
we know it”. However, it allows us to discover mechanisms which are of 
importance in economic transactions and contracting situations. Intuitively, one 
can expect the analysis to grow more complex as social structures in the 
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transaction changes. This might be the case when agent`s become more 
dependent on mutual interests. Nevertheless, this is something Powell highlights 
in his seminal 1990 article. Powell discusses how networks function as a 
distinctive way of coordinating economic activity as a form of economic 
organization on the side of markets and hierarchies. The argument proposed by 
Powell (1990, 303) is that:  
 
“In network models of resource allocation, transactions occur neither 
through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through 
networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually 
supportive action.”  
 
The key differences which is important to our discussion is what shape 
opportunities and expectations; namely the structure and quality of exchange 
ties. Economic relations are no longer cool and atomistic as in “thick” markets, 
but embedded in a more complex set of variables. In the comparison of networks 
and markets Powell (1990) argues that transactions in the former rely on 
complementary strengths and interdependence between the agents. In addition, 
they have relational means of communication, together with reputational 
concerns. Powel (1990, 305) states that:  
 
“Parties to network forms of exchange have lost some of their ability to 
dictate their own future and are increasingly dependent on the activities 
of others.”  
 
Consider as an illustration, Ducati motorcycles; which has a close collaboration 
with nearly 180 suppliers responsible for about 90 % of the total costs. Yet the 
product costs and quality is considered highly competitive (de Wit and Meyer 
2010).  We will not consider the strategic implications of this, however – we will 
link this to our previous discussion. Is the behavior of the agents likely to be 
unchanged when: cooperation is emphasized over competition; you have close 
inter-organizational relations; interaction is based on reciprocity; you have 
durable partnerships and relationships based collaborative agreements? 
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With more than 80 % of Ducati’s network partners located in the Bologna area 
communication and cooperation get easier, and the synergies that emerge can 
be compared to those in industrial clusters as described by Porter (2008). The 
link between network form of economic organization and industrial cluster are 
also drawn by Powell (1990). Powell point to the economic development in 
Emilian in north-central Italy; here groups of firms are located in specific areas 
according to what they produce. Production is organized in collaborative 
agreements where only a fragment of the firms ends with a final product. Porter 
(2008) argues that agency costs are reduced within industrial clusters due to the 
reasons discussed above. Porter’s main point is that monitoring systems and 
information sharing is facilitated. Based on the previous discussion, can it be a 
possibility that it is the actual behavior of the agents which is subject to change, 
not only the principal’s possibility to reduce information asymmetries? Only 
speculating in this gives us no substantial answer. However, using agency theory 
in terms of a more formal economic approach will guide us. Presumably this will 
illuminate the mechanisms that make agency costs subject to change. At the 
same time it is desirable to be able to assess the criticisms of the agency model 
described above. Eventually, this will be a consequence to what extent we are 
able to discuss agency relations through more complex economic relationships.  
 
Exchange ties and agency costs 
From the above arguments it seems natural that exchange ties should be at the 
core of our discussion. We assume that these ties can converge from weak or 
absent, in an arm’s length transaction, towards a strong set of social and 
professional exchange relationships, when transactions are performed in 
embedded networks. This implies that various forms of economic organization 
facilitate different exchange ties. In other words, when economic transactions 
are performed in network form of organization exchange ties affect the 
transaction compared to those performed in a market. The nature and the 
strength of such ties are likely to influence firm behavior (Gulati, Nohria, and 
Zaheer 2000).  
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Jensen and Meckling (1976, 308) provide good point of departure in terms of our 
theoretical approach: 
 
“We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent. “  
 
Agency costs will arise in any cooperative effort even if the principal-agent 
relationship seem concurrent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In other words, it is 
unrealistic to imagine a transaction without any information asymmetries or 
conflicts in terms of what action to be carried out. Regardless if transactions take 
place in embedded networks it is likely that the variables which influences 
positively the agents level of production also generate a disutility for the agent; 
in that way it is likely to be a conflict between the agent and the principal despite 
their mutual interests. This is stressed to demonstrate that problems of moral 
hazard should not be extraneous in embedded networks. Considering that firms 
become less autonomous when transactions are organized in such way, agency 
theory should be highly relevant. Most of all due to the delegation of activities; 
the principal looses the ability to control actions when they are no longer 
observable.  
 
Cowell (2006, 364) treat agency costs as: “the expected net payoff for the 
Principal under full information less what it is in the second best situation.” If 
agency costs are subject to change in network form of economic organization 
one can speculate that this is partially due to new information structures, and 
partially because new incentives arise with exchange ties.  
 
Model and analysis  
Our analysis will be founded on a moral hazard model with effort and production 
where the agent’s action is not directly observable to the principal. The basics of 
the model are described below. The model and notations in the following 
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subsection will be similar to what is used by Laffont and Martimort 2002 (150-
152). 
 
Consider an agent with an effort which is costly. The agent has either none or 
positive effort normalized to zero or one:   in      . Effort is costly and generates 
a disutility for the agent equal to      where           and        
 .  
 
The agent will receive a transfer   from the principal for exerting effort. This 
implies the following separable utility function:             with         
and         . The stochastic production level   can either take a low or high 
value       and production increases in effort level. The stochastic influence of 
effort on production is given by   and    with    >   . 
 
Further, the principal has a utility function which is increasing in performance 
and prefers production with a positive effort level (   ). The principal can offer 
the agent a contract contingent the verifiable and observable random output  . 
Compensation is linked to output with the function       . Thus, the realized 
production level   or   yields accordingly   or   .  
 
The risk neutral principal expects the following utility:  
                                 
when    , and 
                                
if     .   denotes the principals benefit. 
 
Laffont and Martimort (2002) further derive the moral hazard incentive 
constraint and participation constraint, which ensure agent participation with a 
positive effort: 
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Normalizing the agent’s reservation utility to zero the participation constraint 
writes: 
                      
 
It can be concluded that an incentive feasible contract need to satisfy the above 
constraints. 
  
The above model will be the basis for analyzing the principal’s problem to get the 
agent to put forth effort when there are complex exchange ties (already defined) 
present. This leads us towards a more precise research question: 
 
Is the effort exerted by the agent likely to be influenced as complex exchange ties 
in the principal-agent relationship get stronger?  
 
A careful analysis and discussion of possible modifications to the model will be 
necessary in order to reach the principal’s maximization problem. Taking 
assumptions regarding risk, limited liability and other extensions of the model 
will be a part of this process. A sensible approach will borrow ideas from 
different models such that the reasoning will be of some substance. This calls for 
a thorough review of relevant literature.    
 
It is worth mentioning that there is an existing literature on moral hazard in 
multiperiod relationships (for instance Lambert 1983). One of the arguments in 
this literature is that the principal will learn about the agent. Hence, the behavior 
of the agent can be assessed more appropriately due to a reduction in 
information asymmetry. To dismiss that the approach found in this paper is 
superfluous it is important to emphasize the following: Multiperiod relationships 
can be differentiated from our reasoning. Eisenhardt (1989) recommend to 
extend the agency theory to more complex and richer contexts. In particular 
researchers need to work towards an overall framework with self interest on the 
agenda to improve understanding of such behavior. The motivation for this 
paper is based on Eisnhardt’s recommendation, and inspiration is found in Sobel 
(2005)’s attention to intrinsic reciprocity as a property of preference. Intrinsic 
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reciprocity can be defined as follows (Sobel 2005, 382): “The theory permits 
individual preferences to depend on the consumption of others”. This alludes to 
an individual which is willing to sacrifice own consumptions to the benefit of 
others in response to kind behavior (Sobel 2005). 
 
Considering this, we will reflect on a producer of some good, the principal, which 
operates in an embedded network. Thus, economic transactions regarding the 
production are coordinated in a network form of organization. The principal has 
delegated parts of the production to subcontractors. Accordingly, the principal 
and agent have mutual interests; they are engaged in interdependent 
cooperation with a reputational concern. The relationship is subject to 
reciprocity. In other words, their economic relationship is featured with complex 
exchange ties.     
 
Acknowledging our academic limitations we still believe we can put forth an 
interesting and fruitful discussion based on the content of this report.  
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